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particular. The report’s sections on 
military equipment (pre-conﬂict) that 
are addressed in Section 6.3 and 
the conclusions regarding military 
equipment (post-conﬂict) in Section 
14.2, examine numerous critical issues 
which warrant attention. 
   The report highlights four particular 
issues regarding defence acquisition, 
which should be of importance to 
Ministries of Defence (MoDs):
1) The need to properly identify 
available assets;
2) The need for an appropriate system 
to report the situation on the ground 
without usurping the responsibilities in 
the chain of command;
3) The rapid identiﬁcation of capability 
gaps during operations and;
4) The inherent clash between the 
allocation of scarce resources to 
satisfy immediate operational needs, 
versus those devoted to long-term 
acquisition planning.
WHAT DO WE HAVE?
   The ﬁrst set of issues involves the 
ability of the UK MoD to accurately 
determine what assets are in place 
before a military operation (particularly 
The July 2016 Iraq report from Sir John Chilcot1, addresses some of the most signiﬁcant issues 
concerning UK foreign, defence and 
security policy that have arisen in the 
early 21st century. The focus is justiﬁably 
on issues such as the assessment of 
an Iraqi capability regarding weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD), decision-
making in the Blair government and the 
legal case for going to war.
   It is also worth highlighting some 
of the less salient issues, which are 
signiﬁcant for UK defence policy in 
general and defence acquisition in 
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all Ministries of Defence to take on board when it comes to ensuring troops have the 
equipment and support they need, before the next major military operation starts. 
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A soldier from the RAF Regiment on patrol near Basrah Air Base (Harland Quarrington, MoD/Crown Copyright)
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Iraq in 2009.”7 That is compounded by 
the ﬁnding that: 
   “The MOD had given assurances 
before the 2003 invasion that the 
necessary lessons had been learned 
since 1991. This proved not to be the 
case. In any future eventuality, the 
MoD has a responsibility to ensure that 
past mistakes are not repeated, and 
that its systems for asset tracking  
are robust.”8 
 
DO WE KNOW WHAT WE 
REALLY NEED? 
This leads to the second issue which 
needs to be highlighted. Chilcot notes 
that until May 2003 “neither PJHQ 
(Permanent Joint Headquarters) nor the 
MoD had a proper understanding of 
the problems with equipment that units 
were experiencing on the ground,”9 
citing a speciﬁc recommendation made 
early in 2003 that “a direct and robust 
system accurately to report on readiness 
and equipment issues from theatre to 
Ministers was needed.”10
   Chilcot concedes that the pressure 
of operations makes it difﬁcult to 
generate such a reporting chain and 
that “military commanders need the 
freedom to take operational decisions.”11 
However, Chilcot’s recommendation 
is that in “any future operations, the 
MoD should ensure that it has robust 
an unexpected operation) takes 
place. In his key ﬁndings, Chilcot 
provides positive commentary for 
the UK military in responding to the 
requirements for the Iraq campaign 
while operating within particularly 
restrictive parameters2, noting that the 
UK’s achievements “in preparing the 
forces deployed for combat operations 
in Iraq against tight deadlines were very 
considerable.”3
   However, the difﬁculties under which 
the UK had to deploy forces more 
quickly than anticipated in the Defence 
Planning Assumptions, meant that 
“there were some serious equipment 
shortfalls when conﬂict began.”4 
Chilcott notes that:
   “In particular, poor asset tracking 
systems meant that an already over-
burdened system was put under even 
greater pressure, and equipment that 
had been deployed to the forces in 
Kuwait did not reach the frontline before 
military operations began.”5
   Chilcott asserts that those shortfalls 
“were exacerbated by the lack of 
an effective asset tracking system,” 
adding that this was a lesson the MoD 
“had identiﬁed, but not adequately 
addressed.”6 Moreover—and 
emphasizing the point—is that the 
“MoD’s asset tracking system was still in 
need of improvement when the UK left 
systems in place to accurately report 
the situation on the ground without 
usurping the responsibilities of the chain 
of command.”12
WHO IS RESPONSIBLE?
   The Chilcot report notes as a key 
ﬁnding that it “was not sufﬁciently clear 
which person or department within the 
MoD had responsibility for identifying 
and articulating capability gaps.”13 
There are two speciﬁc items cited by 
Chilcot that underscore this point. The 
ﬁrst is that: 
   “Delays in providing adequate medium-
weight Protected Patrol Vehicles (PPVs) 
and the failure to meet the needs of UK 
forces in Multi-National Division (South-
East) (MND(SE)) for ISTAR and helicopters 
should not have been tolerated.”14
   Furthermore, Chilcot comments that: 
“As in the case of protected mobility, 
the MoD was slow to respond to the 
deﬁciencies identiﬁed in ISTAR and 
showed a lack of understanding of the 
requirement for an enduring operation. 
The provision of ISTAR capabilities also 
suffered from the absence of a clearly 
identiﬁed sponsor addressing the 
capability gap.”15
   The second item speciﬁcally addresses 
the fact that: 
“The MOD was slow in responding 
to the developing threat in Iraq from 
A Merlin helicopter delivers much needed supplies to an element during a patrol in Maysan Province, Iraq (Cpl. Ian Forsyth, MoD/Crown Copyright)
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The US DoD also experienced delays in 
getting Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected 
Vehicles to troops. (US Army photo)
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). 
The range of protected mobility options 
available to commanders in MND(SE) 
was limited. Although work had begun 
before 2002 to source an additional 
PPV, it was only ordered in July 2006 
following Ministerial intervention.”16
   Chilcot asks the question as to “why it 
took so long to ﬁll a capability gap that 
was apparent from the end of 2003.”17 
He comments that while the process 
for meeting an equipment capability 
gap was clear, “what was unclear was 
where responsibility lay for identifying 
and articulating capability gaps.”18 The 
report notes that as an Urgent Statement 
of User Requirement (USUR) could be 
raised by any user, “there was no single 
individual or team accountable if an 
essential USUR was not raised.”19
   Chilcot cites the Barry Report, which 
was an analysis of the land operations 
in Iraq published in August 2010.20 
It notes that an identiﬁcation of a 
requirement and successful completion 
of an Urgent Operational Requirement 
(UOR) occurred when there was a strong 
sponsor in the Army or MoD.21 The Barry 
Report suggested that successful UORs 
resulted from a ‘pull’ from theatre or a 
‘push’ from MoD equipment staff (as was 
the case with Mastiff).22 
   However, Chilcot has little sympathy 
for the MoD position, noting that:
“The MoD should be proactive in seeking 
to understand and articulate new or 
additional equipment requirements. The 
MoD told the inquiry that there was no 
simple answer to the question of where 
the primary responsibility for identifying 
capability gaps lay during Op TELIC. 
That is unacceptable.”23
Chilcot emphasizes that:
   “The roles and responsibilities for 
identifying and articulating capability 
gaps in enduring operations must be 
clearly deﬁned, communicated and 
understood by those concerned. It is 
possible that this has been addressed 
after the period covered by this inquiry.”24
The MoD appears to have 
acknowledged that certain steps were 
needed to speciﬁcally address capability 
gaps, as it told the inquiry that the 
force protection policy in use in 2015, 
“deﬁnes risk ownership and governance 
more clearly than its predecessors” and 
that the policy had been integrated into 
wider MoD risk management processes, 
which had also been revised.’25 
Chilcot goes on to stress that: 
   “The MoD has suggested to the inquiry 
that successive policies deﬁning risk 
ownership and governance more clearly 
have addressed that absence, and that 
wider MoD risk management process 
have also been revised. In any future 
operation the level of force protection 
required to meet the assessed threat 
needs to be addressed explicitly.”26
LONG-TERM VS. IMMEDIATE 
NEEDS    
The fourth and ﬁnal point to be 
addressed indicates that the foundation 
of the problem for future conﬂicts may 
not lie in the MoD’s processes, but in 
the culture and behaviour of those who 
handle defence acquisition, and who 
must determine how to allocate scarce 
ﬁnancial resources. Chilcot notes that:
   “Funding was not a direct barrier to 
the identiﬁcation and deployment of 
additional solutions to the medium-
weight PPV gap. But it appears that 
the longer-term focus of the Executive 
Committee of the Army Board (ECAB) 
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on the Future Rapid Effect System (FRES) 
programme inhibited it from addressing 
the more immediate issue related to 
medium-weight PPV capability.”27
   The Inquiry heard testimony 
from the MoD’s former Minister for 
Defence Procurement Lord Drayson. 
He believed “the Army’s difﬁculty in 
deciding upon a replacement to Snatch 
was in part caused by their concern 
over the likelihood of FRES budgets 
being cut to fund a Snatch replacement 
vehicle.”28 Indeed, the report notes 
that it “is possible, however, that 
the need to preserve funding” for 
FRES, “inﬂuenced decisions on the 
requirement for PPVs.”29 The report 
goes on to say that “a number of 
witnesses to the inquiry made the point 
that, within a ﬁnite budget, resources 
for an additional requirement would 
have to be found from elsewhere in the 
defence programme.”30
Chilcot adds that: 
“Sir Peter Spencer, Chief of Defence 
Procurement from May 2003 to April 
2007, told the inquiry that using money 
from the capital Equipment Programme 
to deal with the short term had a 
“fratricidal effect” on the ability to move 
the FRES programme forward.”31
   Furthermore, the report mentions that: 
“The focus of the Executive Committee 
of the Army Board (ECAB) on the FRES 
programme may therefore provide a 
partial explanation for the lack of urgency 
in addressing the more immediate problem 
of the PPV capability gap. Another likely 
factor was an over-optimistic assumption 
about the timing of withdrawal from Iraq. 
The expectation of an early withdrawal 
from Iraq inhibited action on an expensive 
programme that might not be completed 
before troops left.”32
Chilcot’s comment is that: 
“Those responsible for making 
decisions on the investment in military 
capabilities should continually evaluate 
whether the balance between current 
operational requirements and long-
term defence programmes is right, 
particularly to meet an evolving threat 
on current operations.”33
 
THE UK EXPERIENCE IS NOT 
UNIQUE 
   While the Chilcot report provides 
the most recent vehicle for discussing 
the challenges involved with efﬁciently 
conducting defence acquisition during 
operations, it is important to note that 
the UK MoD is not alone in ﬁnding 
its performance wanting. Former US 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 
comes to the same conclusion regarding 
the inability of the Pentagon bureaucracy 
to focus attention on immediate 
operational needs. Gates notes: 
“The military departments develop their 
budgets on a ﬁve-year basis, and most 
procurement programmes take many 
years—if not decades—from decision 
to delivery. As a result, budgets and 
programmes are locked in for years at 
a time, and all the bureaucratic wiles of 
each military department are dedicated 
to keeping those programmes intact 
and funded. They are joined in those 
efforts by the companies that build the 
equipment, the Washington lobbyists that 
those companies hire, and the members 
of Congress in whose states or districts 
those factories are located. Any threats 
to those long-term programmes are not 
welcome, even if we are at war.”34
Gates goes on to emphasize that:
“…current, urgent requests were weighed 
against the existing long-term plans, 
programmes, and available budgets, 
and all too often were found to be lower 
in priority than nearly everything else—
which meant they disappeared into a 
Pentagon black hole.”35
The Foxhound Light Protected Vehicle: “The need to preserve funding for FRES inﬂuenced decisions on the requirement for PPVs.” 
(Sgt. Ross Tilly RAF, MoD/Crown Copyright)
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   The allocation of resources between 
immediate operational requirements 
and long-term needs for any military 
force is a challenge under any set 
of circumstances. Chilcot highlights 
a number of policy and process 
issues which generated questionable 
performance from the UK MoD in 
acquiring the necessary material for 
Iraq. However, it is also important 
to note the cultural and behavioural 
issues which are a critical part of 
such decision-making, particularly in 
a military organisation. With regard 
to the US Department of Defense’s 
performance, Gates notes that:
“To complicate matters, all the services 
regarded the counterinsurgency wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan as unwelcome 
military aberrations, the kind of conﬂict 
we would never ﬁght again—just 
the way they felt after Vietnam. The 
services all wanted to get back to 
training and equipping our forces for 
the kinds of conﬂict in the future they 
had always planned for: for the Army, 
conventional force-on-force conﬂicts 
against nation-states with large ground 
formations; for the Marine Corps, a 
light, mobile force operating from 
ships and focused on amphibious 
operations; for the Navy; conventional 
maritime operations on the high seas 
centred on aircraft carriers; for the 
Air Force, high-tech air-to-air combat 
and strategic bombing against major 
nation-states.”36
   Gates provides his ﬁnal judgment 
on the Pentagon’s performance in 
providing the required equipment for 
Iraq and Afghanistan, commenting on 
DoD culture and behaviours. Focusing 
speciﬁcally on the delay in getting 
Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected 
Vehicles to troops, Gates writes that:
“As usual in a huge bureaucracy, the 
villains were the largely nameless and 
faceless people—and their leaders—
who were wed to their old plans, 
programmes and thinking and refused 
to change their ways regardless of 
circumstances. The hidebound and 
unresponsive bureaucratic structure 
that the Defense Department uses to 
acquire equipment performs poorly in 
peacetime. As I saw, it did so horribly 
in wartime.”37 
   The Chilcot report addresses many 
critical foreign and security policy 
issues of speciﬁc importance to the 
UK, but also of a broader signiﬁcance 
to any government. While defence 
acquisition is clearly of secondary 
importance, when compared to issues 
such as governmental decision-making 
in going to war, the attention devoted 
by the report to the essential issue of 
equipping military forces for combat 
deserves attention by all military 
organizations, particularly as Gates 
indicates that the Pentagon faced 
similar challenges and had similar 
failures. The value of the Chilcot report 
for any government is to highlight the 
tasks that should be addressed now to 
ensure that troops have the equipment 
and support they need, before the next 
military operation begins. Q
REFERENCES 
1  Chilcot, J. et al.  (2016) The Report of the 
Iraq Inquiry, July 2016, HC264, London: 
The Stationary Ofﬁce, available at http://
www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/the-report/, as of 
14 December 2016.
2   Ibid, Section 6.3, Military Equipment 
(Pre-Conﬂict), p. 2.
3   Ibid, p. 106.
4   Ibid, p. 2.
5   Ibid, p. 108.
6   Ibid, p. 2.
7   Ibid, p. 108.
8   Ibid, p. 108.
9   Ibid, p. 109.
10 Ibid, p. 109.
11 Ibid, p. 109.
12 Ibid, p. 109.
13 Ibid, Section 14.2, Conclusions: Military 
Equipment (Post-Conﬂict), p. 228.
14 Ibid, p. 228.
15 Ibid, p. 237.
16 Ibid, p. 228.
17 Ibid, p. 232.
18 Ibid, p. 232.
19 Ibid, p. 232.
20 Ibid, p. 232.
21 Ibid, p. 232.
22 Ibid, p. 233.
23 Ibid, p. 240.
24 Ibid, p. 240.
25 Ibid, p. 235.
26 Ibid, p. 241.
27 Ibid, p. 228.
28 Ibid, p. 235.
29 Ibid, p. 235.
30 Ibid, p. 235-236.
31 Ibid, p. 236.
32 Ibid, p. 236.
33 Ibid, p. 241.
34 Gates, R. (2014) Duty – Memoirs of a 
Secretary At War.  London: WH Allen, p. 
117.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid, p. 118.
37 Ibid, p. 126.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
   Pete Ito has served as a lecturer 
and researcher in defence acquisition 
at the Centre for Defence Acquisition, 
Cranﬁeld University, Defence 
Academy of the UK since 2008. 
He is the academic leader on the 
Acquisition Employment Training 
course, runs the Financial Military 
Capability (Advanced) course, and 
delivers the International Dimensions 
of Defence Acquisition and Research 
Methodology courses in the Defence 
Acquisition Management MSc. After 
earning a BA in Political Science 
from the University of California at 
Berkeley, a Juris Doctor (Law) degree 
and a MA in International Affairs from 
George Washington University in 
Washington DC, Pete worked for 25 
years as a Foreign Services Ofﬁcer for 
the US State Dept.   
   Peter Antill works at the Centre 
for Defence Acquisition, Cranﬁeld 
University, Defence Academy of the 
UK. He conducts research in defence 
acquisition and has written various 
books, journal articles, case studies, 
conference papers, monographs and 
chapters in edited publications as well 
as updating teaching material used 
by the Centre for Defence Acquisition. 
Peter graduated from Staffordshire 
University in 1993 with a BA (Hons) 
International Relations and followed 
that with an MSc Strategic Studies 
from Aberystwyth in 1995 and a 
PGCE (Post-Compulsory Education) 
from Oxford Brookes in 2005.
